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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a context defined by the deficit-reduction imperative, govern-
ments the world over appear keener than ever to pluralize the forms and 
agents of public service delivery. In practice, however, “pluralization,” 
often means “marketization.” Moreover, in debates prompted by efforts 
to marketize and privatize public services and utilities the state and 
market tend to be treated as external to each other, even opposed to each 
other in a kind of zero-sum tug-of-war, more state meaning less market, 
and vice versa. 
Of course many have questioned the dichotomic picture of the rela-
tion between state and market, pointing to the state’s role in instituting 
the necessary legal and regulatory structures for markets to function in 
the first place. They also note how market logics are introduced by 
states themselves as a means of governance and discipline, particularly 
in the production and delivery of public services. This then raises a 
more general question about market boundaries and the role market 
logics can or should play in shaping and governing our relationships 
with each other. Key questions regarding the future of liberal democrat-
ic polities, therefore, concern the character of public service provision: 
how to justify the extension of the market into, or its withdrawal from, 
one or another domain of social life; and how we can best account for 
the way market logics are promoted, implemented, and contested? 
This Paper revisits this general debate over “market boundaries” in 
order to explore what role psychoanalysis can play in ascertaining when 
and how to extend or restrict the scope of the market in relation to par-
ticular domains of social life. In particular, I argue that a turn to fantasy 
offers us a useful way to explore the scope and limits of a psychoanalyt-
ic contribution to this debate. How, for example, can the appeal to fan-
tasy help us critically assess the provision and delivery of goods and 
services across market, state, and other coordinating agencies? If it is 
true, as some scholars claim, that potent fantasies of independence un-
derpin marketized forms of service provision and delivery, and if equal-
ly powerful fantasies of dependence underpin statist forms of delivery, 
what can psychoanalysis tell us about their relative merits and demerits? 
More interestingly perhaps, what light can psychoanalysis throw on 
other possible modes of provision and delivery, more interdependent 
modes, for example? 
A key objective of this Paper is to bring long-running and ongoing 
debates about market boundaries into closer contact with a psychoana-
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lytically inflected political theory. In order to discharge this objective, I 
divide my Paper into three parts. Part I offers a general perspective on 
the question of what role psychoanalytic theory, and the categories of 
subjectivity and fantasy in particular, can play in developing a critical 
viewpoint on key aspects of political economy. I argue that the rele-
vance of psychoanalysis to a critical political economy can be “staged” 
at any number of sites on the economic circuit and at any number of 
phases of associated policy processes. Part II provides an overview of 
key perspectives on the character and boundaries of markets, showing 
how the category of meaning in hermeneutically informed approaches 
has come to play a crucial role in advancing beyond dominant instru-
mental conceptualizations of the market. Finally, Part III probes the 
limits of meaning and discourse when characterizing or evaluating mar-
ket practices. Approaches linked to the so-called “turn to matter” point 
to these limits and associated concerns, and so I explore the psychoana-
lytic contribution to this debate through this prism: what is the “matter” 
of markets and how does the “matter” of psychoanalysis relate to it? 
Logics of calculability and fantasy are invoked to argue that psychoa-
nalysis has less to tell us about the merits or demerits of market logics 
as such than about the ideological conditions for their extension into, or 
withdrawal from, one or another domain. 
 
I.     THE PLACE OF FANTASY IN A CRITICAL POLTICAL ECONOMY 
 
In considering the place of fantasy in a critical political economy, 
it is perhaps worth clarifying what I mean by this term. In a first sweep, 
I take critical political economy to be a species of critical political theo-
ry, a domain of thought that takes for granted the primacy of the politi-
cal moment in critically explaining the reproduction and transformation 
of social practices, economic practices inclusive. A critical political 
theory tends to draw on a wide range of philosophical resources to ori-
ent problem-driven empirical research and to offer a rationale for both 
normative and ideological critique.1 
Classical political economy was of course always about drawing 
out the connections between economic concepts on the one hand, and 
features of social, political, and economic practice on the other hand. 
There was a clear recognition of the way economic life and other do-
mains of life were in a relation of co-constitution.2 Classical political 
 
 1 Jason Glynos, Fantasy and Identity in Critical Political Theory, 32 FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK 
2, 65–88 (2011). 
 2 There is, of course, a sizeable literature that looks at markets’ relation to society more 
generally. See, e.g., BERNARD HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS (2011); ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION (2002); AL-
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economy can thus be distinguished from a number of other conceptions 
of political economy, including the discipline of economics itself, at 
least insofar as this has been understood to be about principles of eco-
nomic practice that operate and can be grasped in ways that are autono-
mous from wider social, political, and historical contexts. A classical 
political economic sensibility also shares little with the questionable 
idea that political issues must be studied using the methods and assump-
tions of the discipline of economics. 
A critical political economy affirms classical political economy’s 
more capacious understanding of the relationship between economy and 
other spheres of life. But it emphasizes the critical dimension of associ-
ated theoretical efforts, doing so in a number of ways.3 For example, a 
critical political economy might seek to revise key economic concepts 
in order to satisfy alternative normative visions―concepts such as 
commodity, labour, class, or surplus. A critical political economy might 
question the ontological privilege accorded to class, for example, show-
ing how it is overdetermined by other features, such as sex, race, cul-
ture, etc. Critical political economy, then, defines a domain of thought 
the aim of which is to pluralize our understandings of economic pro-
cesses by critically engaging with dominant renditions of the economy. 
This yields a fairly expansive definition of the field of critical political 
economy, which would include Marxist, post-Marxist, critical realist, 
feminist, environmentalist, and poststructuralist approaches within its 
ambit.4 
 
BERT O. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS (1992) 
[hereinafter HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS]; ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE 
VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS (Chicago Univ. Press 1999); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2010); DON SLATER 
& FRAN TONKISS, MARKET SOCIETY: MARKETS AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY (2001); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997). 
 3 See GARY K. BROWNING & ANDREW KILMISTER, CRITICAL AND POST-CRITICAL POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY (2006). 
 4 E.g., MICHAEL H. BEST & WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE POLITICIZED ECONOMY (2d ed. 
1982); ALEX CALLINICOS, THE RESOURCES OF CRITIQUE (2006); COLIN CROUCH, CAPITALIST 
DIVERSITY AND CHANGE: RECOMBINANT GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS 
(2005); COLIN CROUCH, COMMERCIALISATION OR CITIZENSHIP: EDUCATION POLICY AND THE 
FUTURE OF PUBLIC SERVICES (2003); J.K. GIBSON-GRAHAM, THE END OF CAPITALISM (AS WE 
KNEW IT): A FEMINIST CRTIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Univ. of Minnesota Press 2006) 
[hereinafter GIBSON-GRAHAM, THE END OF CAPITALISM]; J.K. GIBSON-GRAHAM, POSTCAPITAL-
IST POLITICS (2006) [hereinafter GIBSON-GRAHAM, POSTCAPITALIST POLITICS]; HARCOURT, 
supra note 2; BOB JESSOP, THE FUTURE OF THE CAPITALIST STATE (2002); STEPHEN A. RESNICK 
& RICHARD D. WOLFF, KNOWLEDGE AND CLASS: A MARXIAN CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONO-
MY (1989); DAVID F. RUCCIO & JACK AMARIGLIO, POSTMODERN MOMENTS IN MODERN ECO-
NOMICS (2003); Bob Jessop, Cultural Political Economy and Critical Policy Studies, 3 CRITICAL 
POL’Y STUD. 336 (2009); Bob Jessop & Stijn Oosterlynck, Cultural Political Economy: On 
Making the Cultural Turn Without Falling into Soft Economic Sociology, 39 GEOFORUM 1155 
(2008); Colin C. Williams, The Market Illusion: Re-Reading Work in Advanced Economies, 25 
INT’L J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 106 (2005). 
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From a poststructuralist point of view, we can resolve the critical 
dimension embedded in the notion of a critical political economy along 
two axes: a normative axis and an ideological axis. As in critical politi-
cal theory, so too in a critical political economy, normative critique 
would take aim at the norms of a practice or regime (the norms of a 
capitalist, neoliberal, or socialist regime for example), while ideological 
critique would take aim at the way we as subjects relate to those norms 
(or to the institution or contestation of those norms). In this view, one 
could be a committed socialist, affirm its norms, and yet still launch a 
devastating critique of the way subjects tend to engage with those norms 
or the way those norms are promoted, instituted, and defended. Follow-
ing Ernesto Laclau, ideological critique here takes aim at the “will to 
closure” or the various “totalizing tendencies,” treating these as relative-
ly autonomous from the normative framework at stake.5 
This poststructuralist understanding of a critical political theory 
forms the immediate backdrop of my objective to contribute to the de-
velopment of a critical political economy by drawing on key concepts of 
psychoanalysis, particularly the concept of fantasy. I begin this process 
by appealing to one of the most obvious ways we can think about the 
relation between psychoanalytic theory and political economy: through 
the moment of consumption. 
 
A.     “Go Forth and Shop”: The Moment of Consumption 
 
We live in an era where leaders of advanced liberal democracies 
can―without irony―call on its citizens to “go forth and shop” as a way 
of discharging their patriotic duty, particularly and most urgently when 
confronted with an economic crisis. An economic crisis can be under-
stood to be a crisis of consumption when it threatens people’s way of 
life―a way of life understood here as inextricably tied to our capacity 
to consume: having the spending power to consume, but also having the 
commodities available to consume. Consumption thus becomes a kind 
of horizon of intelligibility wherein a nation’s economic growth is tied 
to its citizens’ consumption habits, and people’s consumption habits 
both shape, and are shaped by, the nature of their life as such, including 
especially their working life and spending power, for example, their 
wages and access to credit. 
Many commentators agree that Anglo-American market capitalism 
has generated stupendous rises in standards of living for many workers, 
but many also note that this rise has been accompanied by vast inequali-
 
 5 Ernesto Laclau, The Impossibility of Society, 15 CANADIAN J. POL. & SOC. THEORY. 24 
(1991). 
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ties of wealth and income, and much exploitation both within and be-
yond national boundaries. It has been noted how Adam Smith was deep-
ly sensitive to this mixed bag of good and bad, and so his hopes for a 
secure capitalism rested on people’s rising absolute level of consump-
tion as a way of compensating for various forms of labour exploitation 
and rising inequalities of wealth.6 
From within this horizon, then, an economic crisis consists of “any 
period of time in which workers would face extended decreases rather 
than increases in their standards of consumption. Falling workers’ con-
sumption . . . [would threaten] their acceptance of capitalist exploitation 
by depriving them of the compensation for it.”7 For some, both neoclas-
sical and Keynesian responses to the crisis, as well as many labour un-
ion responses to the crisis, while different in the relative importance 
they attribute to individual, regulatory, or collective factors in their di-
agnoses and demands, can nevertheless be understood to be differences 
falling within this horizon.8 In other words, these perspectives can be 
seen to offer different responses to a shared understanding of the crisis 
as a crisis of consumption: how can we best restore some sense of “con-
sumption as usual,” in order to put us back again on the virtuous cycle 
of economic growth?9 And vice versa. 
 
B.     Consumption’s Desire as a Psychoanalytic Entry Point 
 
Given the preeminent importance attributed to consumption in ac-
ademic and policy-making circles, as well as quotidian practices, it is 
perhaps not so surprising that the moment of consumption serves as a 
popular “entry point” for psychoanalytic interventions into, and critical 
engagements with, questions of political economy. A key move in psy-
choanalytic interventions has been its single-minded determination to 
make subjectivity central to its analysis, specifically the notion of split 
subjectivity and its satellite concepts of desire, enjoyment, and fanta-
sy.10 
The significance of this move is sometimes highlighted by con-
trasting the psychoanalytic conception of desire with the standard mar-
 
 6 This might be construed as a form of legitimation corresponding to a particular regime of 
accumulation. 
 7 STEPHEN A. RESNICK & RICHARD D. WOLFF, Exploitation, Consumption, and the Unique-
ness of US Capitalism, in NEW DEPARTURES IN MARXIAN THEORY 341 (2006). 
 8 Id. 
 9 For example, should we let the chips fall where they may, allowing the markets to self-
correct and reboot economic growth? Or should we intervene to restore faith in the markets by 
paying heed to various “animal spirits”? 
 10 See, e.g., Jason Glynos, There Is No Other of the Other: Symptoms of a Decline in Symbol-
ic Faith, 24 PARAGRAPH 78 (2001). 
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ket conceptions of desire, which often entail a somewhat truncated un-
derstanding in terms of individual preferences whose rank order is re-
vealed through price signals. Taking preferences as their starting point, 
however numerous and varied these may be, the business of markets is 
typically understood to be about facilitating and maximizing their satis-
faction. But since standard economic approaches do not ask after the 
justification of preferences, they leave uninterrogated the logic of their 
formation, reproduction, and transformation. Many psychoanalytically 
inspired scholars have, on the contrary, opened up these preference-
formation processes to psychoanalytic investigation and interrogation. 
For example, they point out how consumption practices rely on desire 
as inherently unsatisfied and unsatisfiable. This is a key insight not lost 
on the advertising industries of course―industries the business of which 
is to regularly and widely disseminate a whole array of fantasmatic nar-
ratives construed explicitly as product-placement devices. 
According to psychoanalytic scholars, Lacanian scholars in partic-
ular, there is a constitutive gap separating “subject as lack” (the subject 
as unsatisfied) from “subject as full” (the subject as satisfied) and this 
gap accounts for the apparently addictive quality and power that con-
sumer products can exert over citizen-consumers. Interestingly, and 
some might say somewhat alarmingly, they suggest that a key feature of 
our western human ontology conceived as a function of desire, appears 
to resonate deeply with the logic of consumption itself. Insofar as mar-
ket capitalism is understood to privilege the moment of consumption, 
the critique of market capitalism often becomes coterminous with a 
critique of those logics of fantasmatic desire and enjoyment that buoy 
up everyday consumption practices. 
 
C.     “It’s the Production (and Appropriation) Stupid!” 
 
However insightful and productive some of these incursions into 
the domain of consumption have been, one cannot help but question 
whether this has come also at the expense of detailed analysis and criti-
cal engagement of moments in the economic circuit other than the mo-
ment of consumption―for example, the moment of production.11 Slavoj 
Žižek, for example, has been criticized for precisely this reason, espe-
cially evident in many remarks that betray a fascination with, and 
grudging respect for, the power of capital to constantly reinvent and 
 
 11 In regulation-theoretic terms, one might say that this is equivalent to overemphasizing the 
deficiencies and malleability of the mode of regulation or form of justification, while leaving 
uninterrogated the presupposed regime of accumulation. 
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reproduce itself.12 In this view, the monolithic drive of capital accumu-
lation and reproduction is opposed to the malleable and potentially 
treatable desire for commodities. Detailed analytical treatment of con-
sumption’s desires and fantasies stand in stark contrast to fairly abrupt 
calls to make a political or ethical stand against the relentless drive of 
production and reproduction, for example by calling for negative eco-
nomic growth. 
However, in shifting one’s perspective from capitalism conceived 
as a monolithic and homogeneous force or drive to one conceived as an 
unstable and complex hegemonic formation one can readily draw on the 
work of what could be called the Amherst School of Marxian political 
economy, based, but not by any means restricted to, the economics de-
partment of the University of Massachusetts, and linked to the journal 
Rethinking Marxism.13 Their approach is informed by a detailed reread-
ing of key texts by Marx focused around the notion of “class process.”14 
Class can be and has often been conceived in terms of identity or posi-
tion. However, putting the accent on process tends to shift the focus 
from questions of being to questions of becoming. Class processes are 
here understood not in terms of income, wealth, or property, but rather 
 
 12 See, e.g., Jason Glynos, Capitalism and the Act: From Content to Form and Back Again, in 
LACAN, DISCOURSE, EVENT: NEW ANALYSIS OF TEXTUAL INDETERMINACY (David Pavón Cuél-
lar & Ian Parker eds., forthcoming 2013); Ceren Özselçuk & Yahya M. Madra, Economy, Sur-
plus, Politics: Some Questions on Slavoj Žižek’s Political Economy Critique of Capitalism, in 
DID SOMEBODY SAY IDEOLOGY? ON SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK AND CONSEQUENCES 78 (Fabio Vighi & 
Heiko Feldner eds., 2007). 
 13 See ECONOMIC REPRESENTATIONS: ACADEMIC AND EVERYDAY (David F. Ruccio ed., 
2008); GIBSON-GRAHAM, THE END OF CAPITALISM, supra note 4; GIBSON-GRAHAM, POSTCAPI-
TALIST POLITICS, supra note 4; POSTMODERN MATERIALISM AND THE FUTURE OF MARXIST 
THEORY: ESSAYS IN THE ALTHUSSERIAN TRADITION (Antonio Callari et al. eds, 1996); 
RE/PRESENTING CLASS: ESSAYS IN POSTMODERN MARXISM (J.K. Gibson-Graham et al. eds., 
2001); RESNICK & WOLFF, supra note 4; RUCCIO & AMARIGLIO, supra note 4; Ceren Özselçuk 
& Yahya M. Madra, Enjoyment as an Economic Factor: Reading Marx with Lacan, 3 SUBJEC-
TIVITY 323 (2010) [hereinafter Özselçuk & Madra, Enjoyment as an Economic Factor]; Özselçuk 
& Madra, supra note 12; Ceren Özselçuk, Mourning, Melancholy, and the Politics of Class 
Transformation, 18 RETHINKING MARXISM 225 (2006); Ceren Özselçuk & Yahya M. Madra, 
Psychoanalysis and Marxism: From Capitalist-All to Communist Non-All, 10 PSYCHOANALYSIS, 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 79 (2005); STEPHEN A. RESNICK & RICHARD D. WOLFF, Rethinking Com-
plexity in Economic Theory: The Challenge of Overdetermination, in NEW DEPARTURES IN 
MARXIAN THEORY, supra note 7, at 51; STEPHEN A. RESNICK & RICHARD D. WOLFF, Com-
munism: Between Class and Classless, in NEW DEPARTURES IN MARXIAN THEORY, supra note 7, 
at 137; Yahya M. Madra, Questions of Communism: Ethics, Ontology, Subjectivity, 18 RETHINK-
ING MARXISM 205 (2006). 
 14 The Amherst School of Marxian political economy is by no means incompatible with the 
Essex School of post-Marxism, see ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND 
SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2d ed. 2001); JASON 
GLYNOS & DAVID HOWARTH, LOGICS OF CRITICAL EXPLANATION IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY (2007), where references to the writings of people like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe are not uncommon, nor with many aspects of the Lancaster School of Cultural Political 
Economy, see Jessop, supra note 4, at 336–56; Jessop & Oosterlynck, supra note 4. 
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in terms of surplus labour.15 Class processes are those processes by 
which surplus labour is produced, appropriated, distributed, exchanged, 
and consumed.16 
From a critical point of view, one important benefit conferred by 
highlighting a range of moments on the economic circuit is that it there-
by also pluralizes the sites of psychoanalytic, not merely political and 
normative, entry points. Viewing the economy as a circuit made up of 
multiple and overdetermined moments―moments of production, ap-
propriation, distribution, exchange, and consumption―offers a differ-
ent, even if messier, picture than one based on fairly rigidly defined 
mechanisms or drives.17 In addition to thinking of the moment of con-
sumption as a suitable psychoanalytic entry point, then, we can also 
consider other moments as suitable entry points for more detailed and 
critical analysis. 
Consider the moment of production. One way of understanding the 
focus of recent studies of the operation of fantasies in the context of the 
workplace is to see them as making a psychoanalytic intervention or 
“entry” at the moment of production. One study, for example, finds a 
 
 15 Özselçuk and Madra provide a useful commentary on the Lacanian equivalence between 
surplus jouissance and surplus value when they claim that treating production as a function of 
surplus value (when, for example, it is linked by Lacan and Lacanians to surplus jouissance) is 
already to treat the production process in capitalist terms. But if one were to “reclaim ‘the organi-
zation of surplus labor,’ rather than “the accumulation of capital,” as the entry point of Marxian 
discourse to rethink both the impossibility of, and difference in, class relations,” then we could 
“retheorize surplus value as one mode of relating to surplus labour.” Özselçuk & Madra, supra 
note 12, at 85. 
 If we were to distinguish surplus labour from surplus value and reconstruct the 
proper homology as one between surplus labour and surplus jouissance, then an entire-
ly different picture emerges. In this alternative construction of the homology, not just 
capitalism but all forms of production, appropriation, and distribution are disrupted by 
the paradoxical topology of surplus jouissance. 
Id. at 91. “By universalizing the psychoanalytical insight, in this manner, to all class formations,” 
id., we can pose the question of how we might relate to surplus labour in a way different from 
surplus value, or more generally in a nonexceptional, nonappropriatively, and hence nonexploita-
tive way. 
 16 Consider the case of analyzing the capitalist economy. In this case, such a framework could 
make visible at least three sorts of potentially and politically salient differences: (1) Differences 
within capitalism (i.e., variations at the different moments in the circuit of capital), which can be 
understood in terms of the different claims on the distributions of surplus value, as well as differ-
ent forms of production, exchange, and consumption, given our understanding of surplus labor as 
surplus value, see Bob Jessop, The World Market, Variegated Capitalism and the Crisis of Euro-
pean Integration, in GLOBALISATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 91 (Petros Nousios et al. 
eds., 2012); Bob Jessop, Rethinking the Diversity and Variability of Capitalism: On Variegated 
Capitalism in the World Market, in CAPITALIST DIVERSITY AND DIVERSITY WITHIN CAPITALISM 
209 (Christel Lane & Geoffrey T. Wood eds., 2011); (2) differences from capitalism but still 
operating within class processes (primitive communism, feudalism, slavery, etc); and (3) differ-
ences beyond class processes (certain nonclass understandings of communism). 
 17 As we will see in Part II, this pluralization is apparent in the work of economic sociologists 
like Mark Harvey’s Instituted Economic Process analysis as much as it is in the work of Class 
Process analysis. 
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good portion of fantasies structuring workplace practices to be leader-
ship fantasies―in other words, individuals’ fantasies about their organi-
zational superiors: the caring leader, the accessible leader, the omnipo-
tent leader, and so on.18 Another study charts a range of fantasmatic 
contents in the context of workplace practices.19 For example, one 
woman’s excessive work rate, welcomed and encouraged by her boss, is 
accounted for by appealing to a fantasy in which her efforts would one 
day be rewarded by the long-sought-after recognition of her father. The-
se are instances in which individual fantasies are operative, but instanc-
es of collective fantasies can also be cited.20 
In these studies, fantasies are understood to distract attention away 
from poor pay and conditions, insecurity and exploitation, as well as the 
broader sociocultural and politico-economic conditions that make these 
possible. Such studies are significant because they represent initial at-
tempts to document the content of workplace fantasies, trading on the 
intuition that they have an important role to play in our understanding of 
how social practices―in this case workplace practices―are organized, 
sustained, or potentially transformed. In my view, it is possible to build 
on these insights by linking them more explicitly and systematically to 
the question of ideology, and by making the political and normative 
significance of fantasy clearer.21 
My intervention thus far has been pitched at a fairly high level of 
abstraction. The guiding thread has been the general idea that psychoa-
nalysis and critical political economy can be brought together produc-
tively insofar as they both, in their own ways, provide a critique of “to-
tality” or of “totalizing tendencies.” While psychoanalysis detotalizes 
the subject conceived as a self-transparent and rational preference-
 
 18 Yiannis Gabriel, Meeting God: When Organizational Members Come Face to Face with 
the Supreme Leader, 50 HUM. REL. 315, 315–42 (1997). 
 19 Valerie Walkerdine, Freedom, Psychology and the Neoliberal Worker, 29 SOUNDINGS 47, 
47–61 (2005). 
 20 Cf. Alessia Contu & Hugh Willmott, Studying Practice, 27 ORG. STUD. 1769 (2006); Ken 
Byrne & Stephen Healy, Cooperative Subjects: Toward a Post-Fantasmatic Enjoyment of the 
Economy, 18 RETHINKING MARXISM 241 (2006); Lynne Layton, Irrational Exuberance: Neolib-
eral Subjectivity and the Perversion of Truth, 3 SUBJECTIVITY 303 (2010); Hugh Willmott, Iden-
tities in Organizations: From Interpretive to Critical Analysis (Univ. of Cardiff Bus. Sch., 2007). 
 21 Jason Glynos, Ideological Fantasy at Work, 13 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 275, 275 (2008); see 
also Wei-yuan Chang & Jason Glynos, Ideology and Politics in the Popular Press: The Case of 
the 2009 UK MPs’ Expenses Scandal, in DISCOURSE THEORY AND CRITICAL MEDIA POLITICS 
106 (Lincoln Dahlberg & Sean Phelan eds., 2011); Jason Glynos, On the Ideological and Politi-
cal Significance of Fantasy in the Organization of Work, 16 PSYCHOANALYSIS, CULTURE & 
SOC’Y 373 (2011); Glynos, supra note 1, at 45–68;. There is now a very lively and burgeoning 
literature in the domain of what is called “critical management studies” that explores similar 
issues regarding the link between Lacanian theory and the production process. A number of 
journal special issues have already appeared, and the first edited book on this topic—entitled 
Lacan and Organization—was published in 2010. See LACAN AND ORGANIZATION (Carl 
Cederström & Casper Hoedemaeker eds., 2010), available at http://mayflybooks.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/02/9781906948108LacanAndOrganization.pdf. 
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ordering agent, a critical political economy detotalizes the economy, 
treating it instead as a series of overdetermined moments that are “per-
formed” in different contexts under particular conditions. This suggests 
that fantasy―insofar as this speaks to the idea of split subjectivity―can 
be used as a critical “entry point” for any and all moments in such an 
economic circuit: moments of production, appropriation, distribution, 
exchange, and consumption. 
One can add one final point of substantive and methodological rel-
evance about the “place” of fantasy in a critical political economy. 
Apart from thinking about the place of fantasy in terms of the possible 
entry points into, or sites of, an economic circuit, one can also think of 
the place of fantasy in relation to the policy sphere. Here fantasy is un-
derstood to operate at different phases of the policy process, for exam-
ple, formulation, public justification, as well as implementation. 
But how should one think of the role of fantasy with respect to 
markets, and market boundaries in particular? In moving from general 
considerations of critical political economy to more focused considera-
tions linked to market boundaries, some preliminary groundwork is in 
order. More specifically, to evaluate the contribution of psychoanalytic 
theory to our understanding of market boundaries, it is useful to contex-
tualize this contribution in relation to the debates on this topic and to 
outline the analytical and critical grids available to us in helping us bet-
ter negotiate the different positions in the debates. This will be the task 
of Part II, after which, in Part III, I show how psychoanalytic theory 
might offer a fresh perspective on this debate, with special reference to 
the categories of enjoyment and fantasy. 
 
II.     MARKETS AND BOUNDARIES: FROM MEANS TO MEANING 
 
Tackling the question of market boundaries presupposes a view 
about the character of markets themselves. In this Part, I review a small 
subset of these views, choosing to probe perspectives that touch on 
themes cutting across the domain of critical political economy. In par-
ticular, we may see markets as a means, serving any number of substan-
tive aims, a view shared by advocates of market capitalism, market so-
cialism, and some “third way” variants; we may home in on monetary 
exchange as a key feature of markets, an important aspect of Michael 
Walzer’s theory of justice as domination, for example; we might place 
greater emphasis, instead, on commodity meanings in trying to grasp 
what is most at stake in market practices, treating meaning as more im-
portant than the presence or absence of a literal exchange of money. 
Though not absent in Walzer, this aspect is emphasized by Russell Keat 
and several cultural economists who draw on the work of Alasdair Mac-
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Intyre. Or we might choose to foreground their interdependence with 
nonmarket forms of exchange. Mark Harvey and others associated with 
the “Instituted Economic Process” (IEP) approach offer one very com-
pelling and clear account of this perspective. Or, finally, we might un-
derstand markets as a function of material calculative devices, a feature 
emphasized by Michel Callon and others associated with the Actor 
Network Theory and Science and Technology Studies scholars. I en-
gage with each of these perspectives in what follows. 
 
A.     Markets as Means to Ends 
 
We will find out what works, and we will support the successes and 
stop the failures. We will back anyone―from a multinational com-
pany to a community association―if they can deliver the goods. 
—Tony Blair, Speech at the Aylesbury Estate,  
Southwark, 2 June 199722 
 
The first set of justifications about the appropriateness of relying 
on market logics in a particular domain of life can be summarised by the 
question “Do markets work?” In contemporary political discourse about 
public service reform, this is often understood to be a question about 
whether market mechanisms are successful in meeting specific exoge-
nously defined targets: Will they reduce patient queues or waiting times 
in the context of health care provision? Has the quality of goods and 
service provision improved? Is such provision efficient? Would it in-
crease user choice and satisfaction? Here, markets are treated as a neu-
tral means of coordinating supply and demand in a way that achieves a 
set of substantive aims. 
The terms of public debate over the role of the market and the 
scope of its application thus tend to be dominated by the question of 
whether it can efficiently deliver a particular good: food, healthcare, 
energy, higher education, transport services, etc. The market is treated 
as an instrument to be compared to and contrasted with other devices, 
including centralized forms of coordination, whether state-based or not, 
as well as other decentralized forms of coordination beyond the market, 
based on principles of kinship, reciprocity, or other norms of communi-
ty life. In this context, markets are understood to be largely decentral-
ized systems that rely on price signals to coordinate the production of 
goods and services, as well as the distribution and exchange of associat-
ed property rights. 
 
 22 See also TONY BLAIR, THE COURAGE OF OUR CONVICTIONS: WHY REFORM OF THE PUB-
LIC SERVICES IS THE ROUTE TO SOCIAL JUSTICE (2002). 
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At this level it is immaterial how price signals are set. These may 
be set endogenously in the way neoclassical economists favour or exog-
enously by the state or other regulative bodies, the central point being 
that price signals comprise a crucial boundary condition shaping the 
choices of economic actors. But whether prices are calibrated indirectly 
(e.g., by the relative pressures within and between supply and demand 
crowds) or directly (e.g., through various state-imposed minimum or 
maximum wage restrictions), prices are ideally set at a level that en-
courages competitive behaviour. A market transaction, then, involves 
the exchange of a sum of money (whose value tracks and embodies the 
current price) for a good or service offered by a provider under condi-
tions that promote competition. This way of thinking tends to prompt a 
search for a list of conditions under which it would be possible and de-
sirable to declare a market suitable for implementation. The obverse 
case, of course, would be the production of a list of potential problems 
with state provision (moral hazard problems) or voluntary provision 
(assurance or free-rider problems), which point to the market’s suitabil-
ity by default. 
Viewing the market as a means, rather than as an end, suggests that 
markets are not intrinsically objectionable, their potential virtue or ap-
propriateness being a function of the end to which they serve as a 
means, as well as their contextual conditions of implementation.23 In 
fact, many contemporary theorists of a socialist persuasion acknowledge 
the unparalleled capacity of markets to cope with the complex problem 
of matching the production and distribution of goods and services with a 
heterogeneous and constantly changing demand for goods. For this rea-
son they have sought to disarticulate markets from capitalism in order to 
press the market in the service of socialist ideals, generating a not insig-
nificant literature on market socialism, which reached a high point in 
the 1980s and 1990s.24 In fact it is worth pausing here briefly to consid-
 
 23 David Miller, Why Markets?, in MARKET SOCIALISM 25 (Julian Le Grand & Saul Estrin 
eds., 1989). 
 24 Market socialism has its recent intellectual roots in the calculation debates, specifically 
Oskar Lange’s “competitive solution”’ challenge to Ludwig von Mises’s claim that economic 
calculation was “impossible in an economy without private ownership and a full set of markets.” 
David Belkin, Why Market Socialism? From the Critique of Political Economy to Positive Politi-
cal Economy, in WHY MARKET SOCIALISM?: VOICES FROM DISSENT 3, at 5 (Frank Roosevelt & 
David Belkin eds., 1994). The intellectual roots of market socialism actually stretch further back 
to ideas of nineteenth-century thinkers, such as Robert Owen (“Villages of Cooperation”), 
Charles Fourier (“Phalansteries”), Thomas Hodgskin (Labour Defended Against the Claims of 
Capital), Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Richard Ely, Albert Schaffle (The Quintessence of Socialism), 
and John Stuart Mill (Principles of Political Economy). On this, see id.; Miller, supra note 23; 
and DAVID MILLER, MARKET, STATE, AND COMMUNITY: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
MARKET SOCIALISM (1989). On the calculation debate, see PETER BOETTKE, SOCIALISM AND 
THE MARKET: COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (2000). On market socialism generally, see, 
for example, ANTHONY DE JASAY, MARKET SOCIALISM: A SCRUTINY: “THIS SQUARE CIRCLE” 
(1990); MARKET SOCIALISM: THE DEBATE AMONG SOCIALISTS (Bertell Ollman ed., 1998); 
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er the perspective of market socialism in more detail because it tends to 
foreground this understanding of markets as a means of achieving or 
promoting exogenously defined ideals. 
The strategy of contemporary market socialists is to disconnect so-
cialist ends from traditionally conceived socialist means (state owner-
ship of production, centralised planning of distribution) in order to re-
connect them to market means by pointing to the latter’s merits or by 
pointing to the failures of central planning.25 The crucial insight here 
involves contesting the assumption of an essential link between capital-
ism and markets. In fact, in the wake of considerable growth in coopera-
tives―in Britain, from under twenty in 1975 to around 1600 in 
198926―David Miller marshals empirical evidence to show that central 
socialist values like democracy, freedom, equality, and community can 
be promoted through an appropriately institutionalised market, while 
maintaining, even enhancing, the virtues of efficiency and entrepreneur-
ship conventionally associated with the market.27 As to what counts as 
an “appropriately institutionalised market,” market socialists typically 
flesh this out as a function of cooperatives buoyed up by a plurality of 
capital investment agencies. For cooperatives entail the collective own-
ership and democratic control over the means of production and distri-
bution of surplus labour, thereby promoting the ideal of freedom―both 
in terms of work and, indirectly, in terms of consumption. And yet such 
an “appropriately institutionalized market” need not, according to its 
advocates, foreclose the operation of capitalist markets and firms, only 
that “the cooperative sector remains the dominant one in the economy, 
setting employment standards and income norms for the other sec-
tors.”28 
The central point remains, however, that from the perspective of 
markets conceived as a means, the difference between market socialism 
and market capitalism amounts largely to a difference in the objectives 
they want markets to discharge. Whether market logics are appropriate 
is a function of how successful they are, under specific contextual con-
 
MARKET SOCIALISM: THE CURRENT DEBATE (Pranab K. Bardhan & John E. Roemer eds., 1993); 
MARKET SOCIALISM OR RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM? (Anders Åslund ed., 1992); MARKET 
SOCIALISM, supra note 23; MARKET SOCIALISM: WHOSE CHOICE? (Ian Forbes ed., 1987); DAVID 
MCNALLY, AGAINST THE MARKET: POLITICAL ECONOMY, MARKET SOCIALISM AND THE MARX-
IST CRITIQUE (1993); MILLER, supra; CHRISTOPHER PROUT, MARKET SOCIALISM IN YUGOSLA-
VIA (1985); WHY MARKET SOCIALISM?, supra; JAMES A. YUNKER, ON THE POLITICAL ECONO-
MY OF MARKET SOCIALISM: ESSAYS AND ANALYSES (2001). 
 25 Saul Estrin & Julian Le Grand, Market Socialism, in MARKET SOCIALISM, supra note 23, 
at 1. 
 26 Id. at 17. As of 2011, there are around 5500 cooperatives in the United Kingdom. See CO-
OPERATIVES UK, http:www.uk.coop (last visited June 16, 2012). 
 27 David Miller, A Vision of Market Socialism: How It Might Work—And Its Problems, in 
WHY MARKET SOCIALISM?, supra note 24, at 247. 
 28 Id. at 256. 
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ditions, in helping to achieve particular purposes and promote specific 
ideals.29 
 
B.     Markets as Spheres of Monetary Exchange 
 
Advocates of market socialism accept in principle the potential 
benefits of market logics but question the necessity of a capitalist 
framework within which they are meant to operate. Instead of accepting 
the hegemonic construal of markets as inherently capitalist, they seek to 
make possible an alternative, socialist use of markets, which is both 
feasible and desirable. Its feasibility is defended in technical economic 
and legal terms that recognize the power of consumer choice to shape 
production volume and priorities, as well as establish discipline and 
extract efficiencies; and its desirability is couched in terms of its com-
patibility with, and potential to promote, the value of democratic free-
dom and equality, particularly in the context of the workplace. 
However, even if one accepts the force of this intervention, are 
there other reasons that may cause us to hesitate before extending mar-
ket logics into new areas of social life? If, for example, it were possible 
to institutionalise a market―even a market oriented toward socialist 
objectives and ideals―in the domain of higher education or health, are 
there reasons why we might argue that monetary exchange or ability to 
pay may not be a desirable criterion of distribution? In this Section, I 
consider the work of Michael Walzer who responds to this question in 
the affirmative, suggesting that his position can be justified by appeal to 
the values of institutional integrity and pluralism. 
Walzer’s views on the proper way to understand the nature and 
scope of markets stem from more general considerations about how we 
should understand justice.30 Unlike monistic approaches to justice of the 
Rawlsian sort, Walzer understands justice in a radically plural way. 
Instead of searching for an underlying principle of justice, which would 
cut across all social domains (whether on the basis of need, desert, 
equality, fairness, etc.), Walzer treats modern liberal-democratic socie-
ties as comprising a plurality of distinct spheres, defined by their goods 
and the distributive principles shaped by the meaning of these goods.31 
 
 29 Issues of feasibility and implementation are compounded in the case of market socialism 
due to the latter’s apparent reliance on path-dependency issues (i.e., market socialism appears 
more likely to succeed in the wake of a market capitalist environment rather than a communist 
central planning environment) and collective action issues. See id. 
 30 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
(1983). 
 31 Central categories of good identified by Walzer (with their distributive criteria) include: 
money and commodities (ability to pay); security, health, and welfare (need); political power 
(votes); kinship and love (gift); offices of employment (skills); leisure/free time (desert, intrinsic 
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Walzer suggests that this sphere pluralism is the product of an “art of 
separation” which characterizes the development of Western polities, 
wherein the political power of the state underwent a series of limita-
tions, involving its separation from the personal and the religious.32 
Justice in this view is understood in terms of keeping spheres dis-
tinct by blocking exchanges between them; in other words, by prevent-
ing one sphere’s goods from being exchanged for another’s, and conse-
quently preventing what Walzer calls the tyrannical exercise of power 
by people who possess goods in one sphere over others who possess 
goods in another sphere. Insofar as each sphere incorporates distinct 
institutions, justice is internally connected to the values of pluralism and 
institutional integrity. The specific question of the role and scope of the 
market can thus be treated as an issue of institutional identity: the ability 
to pay in the market sphere of commodities should not be allowed to 
interfere with, or corrupt, the criteria of exchange and distribution of 
other spheres. In short, we should not permit the use of money (the cur-
rency of the commodity sphere) to buy goods of other spheres. 
It should be clear, therefore, how Walzer problematizes the earlier 
set of arguments, which treated the market as a means to some further 
end (the efficient production and distribution of plentiful goods; the 
capitalist ideal of individual freedom and property ownership; or the 
socialist ideal of worker’s democratic freedom and equality). He sug-
gests that the meaning of a good raises, and ought to raise, important 
considerations, which go beyond mere feasibility and efficiency issues 
and beyond the question of whether broader capitalist or socialist objec-
tives can be met. 
Walzer’s approach entails keeping all spheres of justice separate 
from each other, but he worries about the market’s powerful imperialist 
tendencies. His solution, as would be the case in any sphere’s tendency 
to dominate, involves creating the conditions that would discourage or 
prevent exchanges between the sphere of commodities and other 
spheres. This would mean blocking, through legal or moral means, the 
purchase of political favours (as in cash for questions or votes, or poli-
cies for campaign contributions), or the exchange of money for any 
other sphere’s good. 
This account of justice is plausible, Walzer argues, because it re-
flects some very basic intuitions we have about the distinct character of 
 
value); education (equality at basic level, capacity to benefit at higher levels); divine grace (pie-
ty). Other spheres Walzer covers in his Spheres of Justice include recognition/honours, citizen-
ship membership, hard work, and leisure/free time. Id.; cf. David Miller, Introduction, in PLURAL-
ISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY 1, at 5–9 (David Miller & Michael Walzer eds., 1995). 
 32 E.g., Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 POL. THEORY 315 (1984). 
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classes of institutions in general and about the limits of the use of mon-
ey in particular.33 As he puts it, 
every social good or set of goods constitutes, as it were, a distributive 
sphere within which only certain criteria and arrangements are ap-
propriate. Money is inappropriate in the sphere of ecclesiastical of-
fice; it is an intrusion from another sphere. And piety should make 
for no advantage in the market place, as the marketplace has com-
monly been understood.34 
This suggests that a powerful justification for this view of justice relates 
very much to the importance we place upon the value of institutional 
integrity and pluralism. 
An attractive feature of Walzer’s position is that the integrity of in-
stitutional identity (and the pluralism it supports) plays a key role in 
promoting another important value, the value of equality, or what 
Walzer calls “complex equality.” The idea here is that a plurality of 
inequalities (inhering in the different spheres) will have a cancellation, 
rather than compounding, effect across the spheres.35 But Walzer’s main 
argument emerges out of his efforts to foreground the implications of 
taking the meaning of social goods seriously. The central values of in-
stitutional integrity and pluralism point to a notion of injustice con-
ceived as a function of domination through transboundary exchanges. 
However, perhaps we can ask if dominance can be exercised in a much 
more subtle way by blurring the boundaries while at the same time 
maintaining the illegitimacy of literal exchanges across boundaries. In 
other words, there may be a dimension of institutional identity and plu-
ralism that is not adequately addressed by Walzer’s solution of blocking 
literal cross-sphere exchanges. 
 
C.     Markets as Spheres of Commodity Meanings:  
“Preferences are Foundational” 
 
 
 33 WALZER, supra note 30, at 100–03. 
 34 Id. at 10. 
 35 Several scholars have pointed out that Walzer has left unclear the precise relationship 
holding between justice and equality. See Miller, supra note 31. As David Miller puts it, “[h]is 
failure to specify the precise character of the argument connecting pluralism to equality leaves 
him open to the charge that his egalitarianism is vanishingly weak.” David Miller, Complex 
Equality, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY, supra note 31, at 197, 205. While Miller 
accepts the main thrust of this concern, he nevertheless feels that enough resources are to be 
found both in Walzer’s texts and in the literature generally to mount a strong defense of his con-
ception of justice in terms of equality. In treating the link between pluralism and equality as 
empirical, rather than conceptual, Miller appeals to sociological and social-psychological evi-
dence to defend the thesis that the maintenance of the autonomy of spheres promotes complex 
equality, or what he prefers to call “equality of status.” Id.; see also David Miller, What Kind of 
Equality Should the Left Pursue?, in EQUALITY 83 (Jane Franklin ed., 1997). 
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Walzer seeks to restrict the application of market logics to the 
commodity sphere, whose boundaries are determined through an exam-
ination of the meanings inhering in the notion of “commodity,” con-
ceived as a category of good. Walzer believes that the examination of 
the meanings associated with a particular category of good are rich 
enough to define the scope and reach of a sphere, at least in terms of the 
way goods and services are coordinated via exchanges between provid-
ers and users. It justifies blocking the acquisition of one sphere’s good 
with the currency of another sphere. In the case of the commodity 
sphere, this translates into a prohibition against the use of money to 
purchase goods belonging to other spheres. His argument draws on on-
tological considerations rooted in a view of human beings as meaning-
producing animals. It is further bolstered by a mixture of empirical and 
normative considerations, which David Miller has made explicit and 
defended. As we saw above, keeping the spheres relatively autonomous 
means that it is unlikely that any one person will have a monopoly of 
goods in more than one sphere, thereby promoting equality of status. 
However, there are those who feel that Walzer does not take his 
argument far enough. Even if one accepts that Walzer has made the case 
for distinct criteria of distribution as a function of a good’s meaning, is 
it enough to defend pluralism by blocking intersphere exchanges in such 
a literal way? Consider the relatively common call to inject a private 
enterprise ethos into non–private sector institutional practices. Does this 
call not assume that “the generalisation of an enterprise form to the 
conduct of public administration, for example, will not affect the identi-
ty and integrity of public administration but will simply make it ‘work 
better,’”36 and would blocking literal exchanges address these sorts of 
concerns? Walzer’s argument from justice suggests that understanding 
the market simply as a means, an instrument, or tool, misunderstands or 
underestimates the role language and meaning play in the functioning of 
human practices generally and market practices in particular. However, 
it is unclear whether Walzer’s remedy of blocking literal exchanges is 
sufficiently calibrated to his hermeneutic insight. 
Drawing on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Russell Keat high-
lights the importance of the hermeneutic dimension operative in differ-
ent spheres of practice.37 However, he thinks it too restrictive to theorize 
 
 36 Paul du Gay, Organizing Identity: Entrepreneurial Governance and Public Management, 
in QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 151, 159 (Stuart Hall & Paul Du Gay eds., 1996); see also 
PAUL DU GAY, IN PRAISE OF BUREAUCRACY: WEBER, ORGANISATION, AND ETHICS (2000). 
 37 RUSSELL KEAT, CULTURAL GOODS AND THE LIMITS OF THE MARKET (2000); Russell 
Keat, Market Boundaries and the Commodification of Culture, in CULTURE AND ECONOMY 
AFTER THE CULTURAL TURN 92 (Larry J. Ray & R. Andrew Sayer eds., 1999); Russell Keat, The 
Moral Boundaries of the Market [hereinafter Keat, Moral Boundaries of the Market], in ETHICS 
AND MARKETS: CO-OPERATION AND COMPETITION WITHIN CAPITALIST ECONOMIES 6 (Colin 
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the boundaries of the market sphere simply by asking whether money 
has been used to purchase political favours, health services, etc. He ar-
gues that the colonizing tendencies of the market are not limited to such 
literal exchanges, suggesting that they extend to the importation of the 
market sphere’s meanings into other spheres, even if there is no literal 
exchange of money for another sphere’s good. Indeed, Keat suggests 
that “an exclusive focus on what can properly be bought and sold may 
well not fully capture what is at issue, and may even be misleading.”38 
Keat is of course taking his cue from an intuition that is expressed by 
Walzer himself, but, as we noted earlier, Walzer does not fully develop 
the implications of his own intuitions. There is thus a need to 
focus not so much on the purely formal/legal fact of their being ‘pur-
chased’, but rather on what might be called the social meaning (or 
perhaps meanings) of such transactions—to what is involved in treat-
ing or regarding something as a commodity. Once this is recognized, 
one will also realise that things (including people) may be treated or 
regarded in this way without literally becoming commodities, in the 
sense of formally purchasable items; and indeed that it is the former, 
rather than the latter, that is the morally significant feature here.39 
Conceiving sphere dominance as a function of imposed patterns of 
thinking and meaning as well, rather than as a function merely of literal 
monetary exchanges, presses the argument against market colonization 
beyond recommending the mere prevention of direct purchase of goods 
like love, religious absolution, the outcome of a match, political or legal 
favours, etc.40 More precisely, while the appeal to the value of institu-
 
Crouch & David Marquand eds., 1993); see also RUSSELL KEAT ET AL., THE AUTHORITY OF THE 
CONSUMER (1994). 
 38 See Keat, Moral Boundaries of the Market, supra note 37, at 13. 
 39 Id. at 14. 
 40 The classic example of this type of colonization comes from the attempt to extend cost-
benefit analyses to new domains. Consider the case of environmental decision-making. Here, 
cost-benefit analysis—which ironically is relied upon in the face of market failure, the production 
of “bad externalities”—begins by asking hypothetical questions about the willingness of actors to 
pay or be compensated for environmental pollution. More pervasive, however, is the importation 
of a whole array of market terminology and practices since the heyday of the Reagan and 
Thatcher eras. Quite apart from the daily confirmation of this phenomenon in the life of most 
people at work, in their consumption of the media, and in their exposure to political exhortations, 
this has been extensively documented in the literature. See, e.g., NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH, NEW 
LABOUR, NEW LANGUAGE? (2000); STUART HALL, THE HARD ROAD TO RENEWAL: THATCHER-
ISM AND THE CRISIS OF THE LEFT (1988); RUTH LEVITAS, THE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY? SOCIAL 
EXCLUSION AND NEW LABOUR (2nd ed. 2005); RUTH LEVITAS, THE IDEOLOGY OF THE NEW 
RIGHT (1986); RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM (1998). The displacement of emphasis from clients 
or voters to customers, from providers to purchasers, from allocation to competition, from plan-
ning to regulation and deregulation, and from equality of outcome to equality of opportunity, are 
just some of the more clear-cut examples of these language shifts. MARK DRAKEFORD, PRIVATI-
SATION AND SOCIAL POLICY 25–27 (2000). Perhaps most striking of all is the shift from the 
discourse of administration to the discourse of management, which has brought with it a slew of 
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tional integrity remains the source of such an argument, it suggests we 
amplify our understanding of institutional identity by extending its 
scope. 
If the value of institutional integrity is embodied in sphere plural-
ism, the above analysis suggests that the spread of market meanings and 
practices into—not merely literal exchanges across—other domains 
results in the weakening of the spheres’ distinctiveness. This is because 
it imposes its own image upon these domains by way of language, 
goals, norms, and standards.41 The dominance of market meanings is 
impoverishing because it drains the life world of its variety by reinforc-
ing a unitary way of acting and thinking. This is clear when, for exam-
ple, we think about how the commercial enterprise has become the 
model of choice when reforming the production and delivery of goods 
and services in as diverse a set of institutions as hospitals, universities, 
charities, and government departments. While it may not be possible to 
buy your way to the front of a hospital queue or to buy yourself a place 
at a university, it is still possible to claim that such discursive domi-
nance tends to homogenize and blur sphere boundaries through the re-
production and reinforcement of market norms and incentives in other 
spheres, including virtues such as individual self-interest and competi-
tiveness.42 
Depending on the case, the effects of “imported” market meanings 
will be felt more in the context of production or in the context of con-
sumption. Here I will focus on the interplay between these two con-
texts—an interplay mediated most obviously through the notion that 
user preferences reign supreme. In this view, “a central feature of the 
market is that consumer preferences require no justification.”43 But this 
leads to the problem that 
 
associated satellite concepts: accountability, performance indicators and targets, performance-
related pay, etc. As Paul du Gay puts it, the “language of change . . . is a constitutive element of 
contemporary managerial discourse,” wherein the “notion of ‘enterprise’ occupies an absolutely 
crucial position in contemporary discourse of organizational reform”—to the point where “the 
character of the entrepreneur can no longer be represented as just one amongst a plurality of 
ethical personalities but must be seen as assuming an ontological priority.” du Gay, supra note 
36, at 153, 155, 157. 
 41 On this, see Elizabeth Anderson, The Ethical Limitations of the Market, 6 ECON. & PHIL. 
179 (1990). 
 42 See du Gay, supra note 36, at 155–58. 
 43 Keat, Moral Boundaries of the Market, supra note 37, at 16. This argument—that the 
importation of market meanings and techniques of conduct actually distorts and homogenizes 
practices—applies as much to the consumers of goods and services as to the producers of goods 
and services. Russell Keat develops this point in relation to the more general account of social 
practices offered by Alasdair MacIntyre. The key idea here concerns the way markets may serve 
to promote monetary motivations over other sorts of motivations (or indeed may promote aliena-
tion and exploitation, depending on the relative power of producer and appropriator). In After 
Virtue, MacIntyre draws a distinction between internal and external goods. A scientific theory, a 
football match, or a theatrical performance are considered goods internal to science, football, or 
theatre; and each of these practices has embedded within it sets of standards or criteria, enabling 
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there is no guarantee that such preferences will be informed by or in 
any way respect the “authority” of the goals and standards of the 
practice concerned: the market refuses to discriminate between pref-
erences, whereas practices insist on doing so. Any particular group of 
“marketised” cultural practitioners is thus highly vulnerable to com-
petition from rival “producers” who are willing and able to cater, 
more profitably, for consumers whose preferences may be entirely 
antithetical to the meaning and standards of the practice concerned.44 
The potentially deleterious consequences of such moves to “mar-
ketisation” is precisely what is evoked, at least in the sphere of political 
power, with the derogatory use of terms such as “market-driven poli-
tics.”45 Such a market ethos, it is argued, tends to reduce politics to the 
satisfaction of citizens’ preferences, much in the same way that the 
market economy attempts to satisfy consumer preferences. It leads to 
the adoption by governments of a whole set of marketing apparatuses, 
which are normally the bread-and-butter “techniques of conduct” of 
private companies: focus groups, opinion polls, etc. Moreover, it en-
courages governments to capture a larger “voter share” by formulating 
policies that satisfy people’s “given” preferences, rather than creating 
the conditions in which such preferences can be shaped collectively 
through the exercise of public reasoning. And to the extent that politics 
has been moving in this direction since the rise of public relations in the 
early twentieth century,46 it is to be expected that political theories 
themselves would reflect this trend. Most prominent among such theo-
ries are social-choice theories,47 which treat citizens as satisfaction max-
 
participants to make judgments about whether the goods it produces are good, bad, worthy, un-
worthy, etc. But these norms are also what make it possible for participants to enjoy those goods 
and thus to motivate them to produce them by acquiring and exercising relevant skills and capaci-
ties. The argument is that the pursuit of external goods, such as money, prestige, customer satis-
faction, “whilst by no means necessarily absent, must not come to predominate, especially if this 
leads to actions that are at odds with the practice’s internal goals and standards.” Id. A practice is 
distorted because part of what it means to engage in such a practice is to be motivated by the 
enjoyment of its internal goods. The market tends to homogenize a set of practices because the 
vector of distortion points in the same direction, namely, toward monetary rewards or customer 
satisfaction as primary motivator. In other words, our understanding of institutional identity may 
need to reach beyond the view that sphere pluralism remains intact so long as there is no direct 
purchase of another sphere’s good. Instead, it may be necessary to consider extending the notion 
of a threat to institutional integrity to include those cases in which the market meanings and 
techniques of conduct begins to dominate other classes of institutional practice irrespective of 
whether there are (or are not) direct cross-boundary purchases. 
 44 Id. at 19. 
 45 See, e.g., COLIN LEYS, MARKET-DRIVEN POLITICS: NEOLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST (2001). 
 46 AERON DAVIS, PUBLIC RELATIONS DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC RELATIONS, POLITICS AND THE 
MASS MEDIA IN BRITAIN (2002); LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN: EDWARD L. BERNAYS AND 
THE BIRTH OF PUBLIC RELATIONS (Henry Holt & Co. 1998). 
 47 E.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); LAWRENCE M. 
MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986); CHARLES 
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imisers and political decision-making as a means of maximising citizen 
satisfaction. The claim, in this regard, is that such an account of motiva-
tion “may lead to [an] over-emphasis on self-interest which will eventu-
ally deplete the normative legacy of welfare citizenship.”48 In other 
words, the reliance on self-interest by theoreticians acquires a slightly 
more insidious dimension because of the positive feedback effect it 
could generate: the more our policies rely on theories that presuppose 
and thus treat people as self-interested satisfaction maximisers, the more 
they tend to reinforce and encourage such behaviour and outlook, be-
coming in this way a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The central objection to this type of “market colonization” resides 
in the status of preferences that comes with the smuggling in of the no-
tion of “consumer sovereignty.” Keat characterises the spread of market 
meanings, as opposed to market exchanges, as illegitimate because of 
“the assimilation of what should be regarded as judgements of value to 
what are ‘no more than’ the expression of individual preferences: i.e., to 
those rather mysterious entities which . . . are indicated by a consumer’s 
willingness to purchase something.”49 For it is a central feature of the 
market that consumer preferences require no justification. Indeed it is 
this feature that is responsible for generating the efficiency gains of this 
type of distribution. It is the “motor” that affects what and how much of 
a good is produced. 
Of course problems associated with treating given preferences as 
an independent variable that serves as the bedrock of rational choice, 
social choice, and utilitarian forms of explanatory and normative under-
standings have been exhaustively and critically reviewed in the litera-
ture. They share a common concern with the tendency to understand 
rationality rather monolithically and narrowly as instrumental.50 Such 
critiques point to the need to make processes of preference formation 
the central focus of critical analysis, both as a way to better understand 
the practice of producers and consumers and as a way to create the nor-
mative space in which considerations of democracy and fuller concep-
tions of personal and collective autonomy beyond freedom of choice 
may begin to exert some influence. This is not to say that there are 
many instances when user preferences can serve as a legitimate means 
of shaping the way goods and services are produced, distributed, and 
consumed. Affirming this point, however, presupposes we have a broad 
enough analytical framework within which such normative judgements 
 
MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950–1980 (tenth anniversary ed. 
1994); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (5th ed. 1976). 
 48 Peter Taylor-Gooby, Markets and Motives: Trust and Egoism in Welfare Markets, 28 J. 
SOC. POL’Y 97, 99 (1999). 
 49 Keat, Moral Boundaries of the Market, supra note 37, at 16. 
 50 For sample surveys of some of this literature, see Taylor-Gooby, supra note 48, at 100–01; 
and HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 2, chs. 2, 7. 
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can be made, one that takes on board the hermeneutic insight outlined 
earlier, generating descriptive and interpretive nuance within, between, 
and beyond market practices. 
 
D.     Markets as Part of Complex and Interdependent Systems of 
Exchange and Nonexchange 
 
Recent work emerging out of a critical engagement with economic 
sociology and neoinstitutional economics has sought to present just such 
a conceptual and analytical framework that respects the specificity, 
richness, and complexity of market practices and thus also of market 
boundaries. Inspired by Polanyi’s notion of Instituted Economic Process 
(IEP), this approach emphasizes how markets are best seen as always in 
the process of being instituted, and how this process of institution, in 
turn, is best understood using a triple analytical grid. First, “any one set 
of economic exchange processes is interdependent with others, both 
market and non-market, forming nexuses of exchange processes and 
interactions between different markets, as a condition for any given 
exchange process between a class of sellers and a class of buyers.”51 
Second, “differences in the specificities of exchange processes [are] 
analysed across three aspects: the nature of the entities traded, the spe-
cific characteristics of the agents engaged in the exchange process, and 
the spatial and temporal specificities of exchange processes,”52 includ-
ing medium of exchange, as well as the history and context of relations 
between exchanging agents. These aspects speak directly to the herme-
neutical dimension of practices. And finally, such “repositioning of 
markets” entails viewing them not simply as one of a number of possi-
ble exchange processes. This is because the exchange process is itself 
“but one phase in a process that stretches from production, through dis-
tribution to consumption,”53 and describing and explaining a market’s 
complex articulations with these further phases comprise an additional 
and equally important part of understanding its functioning and signifi-
cance. This triple analytical grid, then, seeks to enable researchers to 
capture “the variety and continual transformation of exchange process-
es.”54 When the complex interdependencies between different exchange 
processes, within particular exchange processes, and between different 
 
 51 Mark Harvey & Sally Randles, Markets, the Organisation of Exchanges and ‘Instituted 
Economic Process’: An Analytical Perspective, in MARKETS, RULES AND INSTITUTIONS OF 
EXCHANGE 62, at 77 (Mark Harvey ed., 2010). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Mark Harvey, Introduction: Putting Markets in Their Place, in MARKETS, RULES AND 
INSTITUTIONS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 51, at 1, 3. 
 54 Harvey & Randles, supra note 51. 
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phases in the economic circuit are also understood hermeneutically and 
discursively and thus in terms of overdetermination, IEP enables a po-
tentially high-resolution explanatory and critical engagement with the 
social, normative, and political aspects of an economic circuit. 
IEP provides a loose yet fine-grained framework for generating 
critical explanations of markets and other sorts of exchange relations. 
However, it does not, on its own, furnish specific normative resources 
with which to consider when and why aspects of a particular sort of 
market should be introduced into a particular social sphere. It is here 
that the work of Walzer and Keat may prove helpful, specifically their 
conceptualization of the market as a sphere of commodity meanings. 
We recall how they identify the values of pluralism and institutional 
integrity as key to their critical perspective. This provides us with a 
fruitful starting point because it furnishes us with initial normative 
grounds for preventing the market sphere from dominating other social 
spheres. This is a starting point only because such a perspective does 
not really help us determine when legitimate influence shades into ille-
gitimate domination, whether with respect to one or more nonmarket 
spheres. In other words, the weakness of the argument from pluralism is 
that it still leaves aspects of the normative framework underspecified. 
Because it is pitched at a fairly high level of abstraction, it tends to treat 
all spheres as equally important, resulting in a kind of banal equivalence 
wherein each sphere is regarded as just as attractive as another. 
The problem with remaining at the level of institutional integrity 
and pluralism can be readily appreciated when we note how the impor-
tation of one sphere’s meanings into another may actually be normative-
ly desirable on some occasions. This is clear when we think of the mas-
sive impact effected when the ideal of the equality of the sexes travelled 
from one sphere to another. As Laclau and Mouffe, among others, have 
noted, “[i]n the case of feminism, it was a question of gaining access for 
women first to political rights; later to economic equality; and, with 
contemporary feminism, to equality in the domain of sexuality.”55 There 
is thus a displacement along the axis of gender from a critique of politi-
cal inequality to a critique of economic inequality “which leads to the 
putting in question of other forms of subordination and the demanding 
of new rights.”56 The trouble with remaining at the level of institutional 
integrity and the kind of pluralism it instantiates is the underspecifica-
tion of the problems associated with the importation of the market ethos 
into particular social domains beyond the simple empirical hypothesis 
that it is (or is becoming) hegemonic.57 
 
 55 LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 14, at 156. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See Colin Williams, The Market Illusion: Re-Reading Work in Advanced Economies, 25 
INT’L J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 106 (2005), for a perspective that contests this view. 
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Perhaps, then, one could argue that there should be a presumption 
in favour of pluralism (on grounds of institutional integrity and, per-
haps, equality), but that this presumption may be rebutted on normative 
and evidentiary grounds. In other words, the kinds of reasons generated 
by a perspective rooted in the value of institutional integrity would still 
carry weight, but they would not be sufficient to accord this value an 
absolute status. The central worry, however, would remain, namely, that 
such a perspective does not offer a special argument about why particu-
lar aspects of a market (such as literal price-mediated exchanges or the 
idea that consumer preferences should be treated as foundational) are 
especially problematic from the point of view of a particular nonmarket 
sphere’s meanings (and vice versa, of course). In order to make more 
robust one’s normative argument in favour or against the extension of 
market boundaries in a particular case, one will have to be more precise 
about the relevant aspects of the market that might be problematic from 
the point of view of the specific dimensions of the practice at stake. In 
short, when talking about how the aspects of one sphere exert an influ-
ence upon another sphere, appeals to terms like “distortion,” “colonisa-
tion,” “imposition,” “domination,” and “infiltration” tend to carry with 
them normatively negative connotations that require further justifica-
tion. 
For example: What aspects of the sphere of politics might one con-
sider to be incompatible with which dimensions of the market sphere, 
and why? According to one view, by privileging preferences over (pub-
lic) reasoning, the importation of market meanings and techniques of 
conduct into other domains such as politics depletes social capital by 
rendering collective action improbable on a range of issues because it 
quashes public deliberation by marginalizing people’s reasoning capaci-
ties and tending, even if only by default, to create the space for the pro-
liferation of individual self-interest. Even if (or perhaps because) indi-
vidual self-interest acts as a powerful motivational force in some 
spheres of life, this should not be allowed to become the dominant mo-
tivational force in politics or other domains.58 This is where one could 
situate the work of republican theorists of freedom, not to mention a 
whole host of deliberative theorists of democracy.59 For they offer us a 
 
 58 See, e.g., CITIZENSHIP, MARKETS, AND THE STATE (Colin Crouch et al. eds., 2001); CATH-
ERINE NEEDHAM, CITIZEN-CONSUMERS: NEW LABOUR’S MARKETPLACE DEMOCRACY (2003); 
Melissa A. Orlie, The Desire for Freedom and the Consumption of Politics, 28 PHIL. & SOC. 
CRITICISM 395 (2002). 
 59 In one version of republican freedom, political freedom is conceived as nondomination. 
PHILIP PETTIT, A THEORY OF FREEDOM: FROM THE PSYCHOLOGY TO THE POLITICS OF AGENCY 
(2001) [hereinafter PETTIT, A THEORY OF FREEDOM]; PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEO-
RY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997); Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory 
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 163 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999). 
This version of republican freedom carries the thought that no one ought to be subject to anoth-
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framework within which a politics of reasons can function not only as a 
space in which another dimension of personal autonomy can flourish, 
thereby acting as a bulwark against the incursion of the market ethos, 
but also as a space wherein one can adjudicate the question of where 
and when it may indeed be appropriate to extend market logics into 
other domains. 
 
III.     FROM MEANING TO MATTER: MARKET BOUNDARIES,  
FANTASY, AND IDEOLOGY 
 
We have seen how the hermeneutic dimension of practices, when 
acknowledged and taken seriously, generates a more nuanced and dif-
ferentiated perspective within which explanatory and critical issues 
linked to market boundaries can be thematized and debated. A key ob-
jective of this final Part is to bring these long-running and ongoing de-
bates about the character of markets and market boundaries into closer 
contact with a psychoanalytically informed political theory. My strategy 
in discharging this objective is to start by situating the fields of psycho-
analysis and political economy—particularly the objects of their inves-
tigation—in relation to a more recent trend—a trend that can be summa-
rized by what I call the “turn to matter” in social and political studies. 
In The New Materialisms, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost com-
ment that “[e]verywhere we look . . . we are witnessing scattered but 
insistent demands for more materialist modes of analysis and for new 
ways of thinking about matter and processes of materialization.”60 They 
interpret these trends “as signs that the more textual approaches associ-
ated with the so-called cultural turn are increasingly being deemed in-
adequate for understanding contemporary society, particularly in light 
of some of its most urgent challenges regarding environmental, demo-
 
er’s capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis, where the two italicized words point to this ideal’s 
central distinguishing themes. “The first theme is that the non-interfering master takes away the 
subject’s freedom [because the master has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily]; the second that the 
non-mastering interferer does not [because it is not arbitrary].” PETTIT, A THEORY OF FREEDOM, 
supra, at 145, 144–49 (emphasis added). The justification for this political ideal of freedom is not 
instrumental: it is not construed as a necessary empirical condition for something else, such as 
negative individual freedom a la Skinner. See QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 
(Canto Classics ed. 2012); P.J. Kelly, Classical Utilitarianism and the Concept of Freedom: A 
Response to the Republican Critique, 6 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 13 (2001); Philip Pettit, Keeping 
Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner, 30 POL. THEORY 339 
(2002). From this point of view, the only way a state can help foster its citizens’ freedom as 
nondomination “is to make the state, so far as possible, non-arbitrary in its operation.” PETTIT, A 
THEORY OF FREEDOM, supra, at 154. This perspective, then, might open up an interesting van-
tage point from which to approach the question of market interference. 
 60 Diana Coole & Samantha Frost, Introducing the New Materialisms, in NEW MATERIAL-
ISMS: ONTOLOGY, AGENCY, AND POLITICS 1, 2 (Diana Coole & Samantha Frost eds., 2010). 
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graphic, geopolitical, and economic change.”61 In this call to move be-
yond the cultural turn, however, it is worth emphasizing what is com-
mon among these textual and discursive approaches, including ap-
proaches linked to well-known cognate “turns”: the linguistic turn, the 
semiotic turn, the discursive turn, and so on. Especially when viewed 
against the backdrop of a social science paradigm defined in terms of 
causal laws and mechanisms, we could say that discursive approaches 
associated with the cultural turn have in common their affirmation of 
the hermeneutic insight, namely, that any social study must begin by 
taking seriously the self-interpretations and wider discursive contexts of 
subjects embedded in practices. 
It is against this background that Coole and Frost conclude that 
“[o]ur contemporary context demands a theoretical rapprochement with 
material realism.”62 So we get the idea here that the appeal to “matter” 
aims to capture something about the limits of discourse and meaning, 
without, however, losing sight of the hermeneutic insight. This gener-
ates the following three sets of questions. First, how might we best con-
ceptualize the matter of markets? I try to cash this out with the help of 
Actor Network Theory in terms of “logics of calculability.” A second 
question is how best we might conceptualize the matter of psychoanaly-
sis, which I address in terms of “enjoyment”and “logics of fantasy.” My 
overarching aim is to juxtapose these two perspectives on matter and 
see what that produces in terms of effects. I ask how we can begin to 
think the relation between these two sorts of matter and what insights 
psychoanalytic theory can generate on the question of market bounda-
ries. 
 
A.     Market Matter: Logics of Calculability 
 
In this Section, I focus on an approach to markets mentioned in the 
introduction but so far not elaborated. This perspective emerges out of a 
particular strand of economic sociology called Actor Network Theory 
(ANT), usually associated with the names of Bruno Latour, Michel Cal-
lon, and John Law. Drawing on Science and Technology Studies, this 
approach sets out to describe in detail and with nuance what is specific 
about market practices and indeed other practices, thereby opening up a 
space in which to deploy more explicitly normative arguments around 
the question of market boundaries. One reason for focusing on this ap-
proach is that it shares with psychoanalytic theory a sensitivity to the 
materiality of a practice, specifically that which escapes discursive cap-
 
 61 Id. at 2–3. 
 62 Id. at 6. 
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ture, or rather, what lies at the limits of discourse and meaning. Callon’s 
work on markets, for example, focuses on a key condition that makes 
possible the pricing of goods and services, namely, their “calculabil-
ity.”63 When it bumps up against the world, markets experience this 
discursive limit as a perturbation that it needs to tame through a process 
of formalization, by deploying its logics of calculability. Discursive 
limits thus have an external source, even if they can only be processed 
internally using already available discursive resources. Logics of calcu-
lability help transform the perturbation into something that is assimila-
ble and understandable by means of a “calculative assemblage” (a 
whole army of calculative agents and material instruments). Such an 
approach, moreover, 
emphasizes the diversity of possible forms of market organization. A 
good can be rendered calculable—that is, individualized and objecti-
fied—in a multitude of different ways. Calculative agencies are as 
numerous and diverse as the tools they use and the hybrid collectives 
to which those tools belong.64 
Yet, despite this recognition of diversity in the way goods and ser-
vices are rendered calculable, the idea that markets rely on conditions 
that make calculation possible remains constant—in other words, logics 
of calculability appear to play a critical role in the operation of markets. 
From this perspective, the market ideal of consumer sovereignty and 
preference-based choice might assume not only that consumer prefer-
ences are given or fixed or that consumer preferences require no justifi-
cation. It assumes two further things in particular. First, it assumes 
goods and services must be well defined and delimited at the moment of 
exchange in order to ensure the orderly passage of rights in property 
from one party to the other (in the form of a discrete transaction); and 
second, it assumes that the terms of exchange are also well defined in 
advance. The question of market boundaries might then be reformulated 
as follows: When, and in what form, is the introduction of calculability 
conditions into a particular sphere of practice appropriate?65 
 
 63 Michel Callon, Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics, in 
THE LAWS OF THE MARKETS 1, 22–24 (Michel Callon ed., 1998). 
 64 Michel Callon & Fabian Muniesa, Peripheral Vision: Economic Markets as Calculative 
Collective Devices, 26 ORG. STUD. 1229, 1245 (2005). 
 65 Their perspective allows us to pose questions about asymmetries of power, where power is 
understood in terms of calculative capacity. Relations of domination, then, can be understood to 
exist where there is a pronounced concentration in the hands of one party of powers of calcula-
tion. See id. at 1239, 1245. In the case of a supermarket, for example, “irrespective of how strong 
the consumer’s calculative agency that evaluates the attachment of goods to his or her own world 
may be, it remains weak compared with the calculative power of supply, which is highly 
equipped, at least in the case of mass retail.” Id. at 1238. Of course, consumers  
continue to calculate, i.e. to evaluate their attachment to a good, but they do so by 
means of tools designed by the seller. By walking down supermarket aisles, inspecting 
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So far I have sketched out a picture of one key aspect of markets in 
terms of logics of calculability. But the question of market boundaries 
as formulated here also implies having a view about the character and 
logics of other social domains, if only because the sense and signifi-
cance of market boundaries is most forcefully appreciated when market 
logics start to impinge upon erstwhile nonmarket domains such as poli-
tics, health, or education. In other words, answering the question of 
when it is appropriate to extend market logics entails forming a judge-
ment about the character of other social domains, too. 
If we look to the domain of politics, for example, we can see a 
whole array of calculative devices being deployed in the service of ren-
dering political entities calculable and thus exchangeable for citizens’ 
votes (e.g., in the form of manifesto promises), at least in democratic 
polities that rely on aggregative forms of fixed-term elections. These 
include professional pollsters, survey templates, focus groups, and so 
on. Market logics of calculability might then be counterposed to logics 
of collective and public deliberation. 
 
1.     Calculability Logics and Logics of Care and Attunement 
 
The boundaries and limits of markets can, of course, be drawn with 
reference to domains other than politics. Annemarie Mol—also drawing 
on ANT—considers the question of boundaries in relation to the domain 
of health, diabetic health care in particular, where she counterposes 
logics of choice and calculation to logics of care.66 For Mol, there is a 
clear problem with attempts to introduce market logics into diabetic 
care practice. This is because the market 
requires that some product (device, plus skills training, plus kindness 
and attention) is delineated as the product on offer. A lot may be in-
 
shelves and reading labels, consumers continue a calculation that was started and 
framed by qualified professionals. But they can reverse the relationship. In this respect 
it is appropriate to remember the useful distinction between planned and impulsive 
buying. The former corresponds to greater autonomy for the consumer, whose equip-
ment, prepared in advance, depends less on that provided by the shop. By contrast, the 
latter corresponds to a heteronomous position in which the consumer, strolling along 
without any specific intention, becomes an appendage of the calculative device created 
by the experts of marketing and stock. . . . In these encounters, whether it is the con-
sumer hesitating between two packets of smoked ham or a couple anxiously following 
the real estate agent’s calculations to assess their debt capacity, radically different val-
ues are confronted. When a compromise is reached it has to be interpreted as a com-
promise not on values but on the instruments that calculate values. 
Id. at 1239 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 66 Cf. Jason Glynos & Ewen Speed, Varieties of Co-Production in Public Services: Time-
banks in a UK Health Policy Context, 6 CRITICAL POL’Y STUD. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with 
author). 
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cluded in this product, but what is on offer and what is not has to be 
specified. Then, or so the logic of choice has it, you may choose it or 
not.67 
In other words, “a market requires that the product that changes 
hands in a transaction be clearly defined.”68 By contrast, diabetic care, 
and by extension much health care practice, is understood in terms of an 
open-ended process whose boundaries are negotiated and renegotiated 
on an ongoing basis. This difference, according to Mol, is irreducible. 
Moreover, in the logics of care, “offering support is not the same thing 
as doing what patients want” or think they would choose.69 
The key “material” point here is that by trying to make diabetic 
treatment calculable, Mol argues that the market cannot accommodate 
what is specific to care practice. In this view, caring is largely a “practi-
cal matter.” She points out, of course, that 
[t]his does not mean that nobody ever needs to be make choices [or 
calculations]. Instead, in this logic “making a choice” appears as yet 
another practical task [governed by a different logic because it is sit-
uated in a different materialist assemblage]. Take the choice [and 
implied calculation invoked by the question] “shall I play sport seri-
ously or not?” This depends on more than arguments. . . . [Of 
course], as part of making this [calculation and] choice, you have to 
figure out if you can get yourself to eat on time, [as well as] measure, 
[and] adapt your insulin dose. [But, h]ours after your football match 
or your jogging hour, your blood sugar level may still drop: can you 
watch out for that?70 
The idea here is that one cannot in advance anticipate, delimit, or 
calculate what contingencies your body will throw up. It is an essential 
part of care to experiment and probe the limits of one’s body in different 
contexts, then adjust the care regime accordingly, including one’s 
hopes, expectations, and associated meanings. Such adjustments will 
take place over extended periods of time, sometimes in response to sur-
prising and unexpected findings, and often with the assistance and ad-
vice of health professionals. Logics of calculation can thus be contrasted 
with what one could call logics of “attunement.”71 There is a gradual 
and constant adjustment, or attunement, of activities on the part of the 
patient and on the part of the health professionals to each other, to new 
medical developments, to new contexts, to one’s hermeneutic and nor-
mative frameworks, and so on. 
 
 67 ANNEMARIE MOL, THE LOGIC OF CARE: HEALTH AND THE PROBLEM OF PATIENT CHOICE 
20 (2008). 
 68 Id. at 23. 
 69 Id. at 29. 
 70 Id. at 93. 
 71 See id. at 58–62. 
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2.     From Market Matter to Psychoanalytic Matter 
 
ANT offers a way of thinking about market practices in terms of 
logics of calculability, contrasting this with health care practices cashed 
out in terms of logics of attunement. In both cases, we have seen how 
the material dimension of these logics is essential to their operation, 
where “matter” is understood with reference to the idea of discursive 
limits. In the case of markets, these limits are approached through vari-
ous processes of formalization or logics of calculability. In the case of 
health, these limits are approached through logics of attunement, pro-
cesses that respond to the contingencies thrown up on an ongoing basis 
in care practices, most notably by the body. Such a perspective clearly 
opens up a space to think about why we might hesitate before extending 
market logics into new domains of social life. 
What sorts of question, then, might a psychoanalytic perspective 
provoke? At the outset of Part III, I invoked the “turn to matter” as a 
way of framing my argument and, as we have seen so far, it is important 
for the advocates of the ANT approach to move beyond an exclusive 
concern with discourse and meaning. In foregrounding, the “material” 
dimension of practices they point to the myriad ways discourse and 
matter become inextricably intertwined in what they theorize as “actor-
networks”: interlinked instruments, bodies, and minds. In shifting our 
focus along this axis, then, we might ask what we should take to be the 
matter of psychoanalysis? 
 
B.     Psychoanalytic Matter: The Role of Enjoyment and Fantasy in a 
Critical Political Economy 
 
At first sight, asking after the “matter” of psychoanalysis may 
seem a tall order. After all, discourse and meaning are central to the 
psychoanalytic enterprise. Perhaps, however, its key concept—the un-
conscious —has more to do with the limits of discourse and meaning 
than with discourse and meaning per se? In which case psychoanalysis 
shares an affinity with the ANT approach insofar as they both appeal to 
a type of matter construed in terms of limits to discourse and meaning. 
Following this line of thought, we could say that the material dimension 
of psychoanalytic theory and practice can be summarized in the word 
enjoyment. 
In one of his many colourful formulations, this one from Seminar 
17, Lacan describes enjoyment as that which “once you have started, 
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you never know where it will end. It begins with a tickle and ends in a 
blaze of petrol.”72 Enjoyment, or what Lacan calls jouissance, is closely 
associated with the Freudian notions of libido, primordial loss, or pri-
mary repression. Analysts use this category, along with a set of other 
concepts such as fantasy, desire, repression, and so on, to account for a 
symptom’s inertia—its resistance to our conscious attempts to dissolve 
it. 
Inertia serves as a way to grasp the material dimension coursing 
through psychoanalytic practice. And enjoyment (or unconscious pleas-
ure) presents itself as a concept with which to understand this inertia. So 
we could say that Lacan glosses Freud’s notion of a primordial loss as a 
loss of enjoyment, where the notion of primordial loss is, according to 
Freud and Lacan, constitutive of subjectivity. The “lost object” is pri-
mordial in the sense that it is something we never had—and for this 
reason impossible to recover. Nevertheless, it is said that this lost object 
structures the desire and being of the subject. So enjoyment is linked to 
impossibility and its fantasized overcoming. The psychoanalytic claim, 
in short, is that the subject derives its sense of being through enjoyment. 
This, then, is one way of conceptualizing the matter of psychoanalysis. 
 
1.     Enjoyment, Affect, and Fantasy 
 
The focus on enjoyment as part of an enhanced analytical frame-
work can also be seen as partaking in another trend besides the “turn to 
matter,” often labeled the “affective turn,” and culminating now in a 
thriving “sociology and politics of emotions.”73 The insight shared by 
scholars, including Lacanian scholars, is that by taking into account 
emotion, affect, and passion, one may be able to reach a more thorough 
understanding of the material dimension of discourse as that which 
“sticks.”74 
The emphasis placed by Lacanian scholars on emotion, affect, and 
enjoyment may come as a bit of a surprise to an earlier generation much 
more accustomed to Lacan’s notoriety as a symbolic and intellectual 
“snob.” But the emphasis placed upon the symbolic order by Lacan is 
better understood as indicating a complex approach to affect rather than 
a demotion of emotion. No doubt Lacan cautions against what he sees 
 
 72 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK XVII: THE OTHER SIDE OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 72 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Russell Grigg trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 2007) 
(1991). 
 73 See SIMON WILLIAMS, EMOTION AND SOCIAL THEORY: CORPOREAL REFLECTIONS ON THE 
(IR)RATIONAL 1 (2001); see also RESEARCH AGENDAS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS (Theo-
dore D. Kemper ed., 1990); Jeff Goodwin et al., Introduction: Why Emotions Matter, in PAS-
SIONATE POLITICS: EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1 (Jeff Goodwin et al. eds., 2001). 
 74 SARA AHMED, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF EMOTION (2004). 
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as a temptation to treat emotions as brute factums, in other words, to 
reify emotions, attributing to them an autonomy and identity that exists 
independently of their wider discursive framing, a perspective shared of 
course by many non-Lacanian scholars, too. 
Taking affect to represent a quantum of libidinal energy, the sug-
gestion here is that emotion should be understood in terms of the way 
affect gets caught up in a network of words or signifiers. So Lacan pos-
its a kind of methodological postulate, which we could put in the form 
of the injunction “Follow the signifier!,” implying that we pay special 
attention to the “letter” of what is said through multiple displacements 
of affect. This suggests that a key aspect of understanding the signifi-
cance of emotions in the organization of social practices involves trying 
to map them in relation to the underlying fantasies that organize enjoy-
ment.75 
For purposes of offering an initial sketch, we could say, following 
Freud, that fantasy denotes a framing device which subjects use to “pro-
tect” themselves from the anxiety associated with the idea that there is 
no ultimate guarantee or law underlying and guiding our social exist-
ence. This guarantee has been given many names, certainly when one 
takes the long historical view: God, Reason, the Senses, the Laws of 
History, and so on. But this guarantee—conceived as a key part of the 
fantasmatic device used to defend against a form of “Cartesian anxie-
ty”—can take any guise whatsoever. 
An important aspect of fantasy is that the status psychoanalysis 
gives to it is not so much epistemological as it is ontological and ethical. 
While fantasy may take on a potentially infinite number of different 
contents, it also has a certain logic. For example, we could say that the 
logic of fantasy is such that there will always be features of its narrative 
that tend to resist public official disclosure because they are in some 
way socially prohibited or unsettling. All this is simply to say that the 
appeal to fantasy should be understood primarily as a means to access 
the structure of desire and libido, rather than as a means of dismissing a 
belief or worldview as untrue or irrational because it does not conform 
to a particular understanding of reality. 
Within this general framework, then, we could get at the content of 
fantasy by exploring, for example, its ideals, the obstacles to achieving 
such ideals, the way challenges can be overcome, the vision of a suc-
cessful outcome, and the imagined consequences of failure. Construct-
ing fantasy in this way has clear political implications—for example, 
normative and policy implications—because the identities of key play-
ers and visions in the fantasmatic narrative correspond only to a subset 
 
 75 As a side note, it is worth noting how, in the case of the MPs’ expenses scandal, an analysis 
of the reports during 2009 reveal the contours of at least two such fantasies: fantasies of self-
sufficiency and fantasies of paternalism. Chang & Glynos, supra note 21. 
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of possible visions or ideals, thereby structuring and delimiting our ide-
as about which social norms are worthy of public contestation and how 
they should be revised.76 
Having said something about the matter of psychoanalysis, I will 
now start the journey back to the problem of market boundaries by re-
calling the way fantasy can work, and has already worked, as a useful 
“entry point” from the point of view of a general critical political econ-
omy. I can summarize in two steps the analytical and critical benefits of 
focusing on fantasy, whatever moments in the economic circuit one 
cares to probe. First, such a perspective highlights how fantasy may 
serve to bolster certain ideals that are not only contestable but also nor-
matively suspect. Second, it reveals how a subject can get hooked into 
its logic, in the sense that the subject becomes strongly attached to or 
gripped by it. These two aspects relate to questions of fantasmatic con-
tent on the one hand, and on the other hand the mode by which a subject 
relates to this content. 
This two-fold point is neatly and crisply summarized in Lacan’s 
claim that even if a patient’s wife really is sleeping around with other 
men, the husband’s jealousy can still be regarded as pathological. La-
can’s point here is that, while it is true that this man’s jealousy is struc-
tured around the specific content of his fantasy (in which his wife and 
other men play lead roles), and while this content may—or may not—
diverge from our consensus reality (i.e., whether she really is sleeping 
around or not), the manner and degree of investment in this fantasmatic 
narrative speaks to something other than the content, namely, the mode 
of his enjoyment. 
Both these aspects are important of course, but the mode of enjoy-
ment aims at something distinctive within the Lacanian framework, 
namely, the idea of a psychoanalytic ethic that can contribute to a theory 
of ideology, and that takes its distance from standard conceptions of 
ideology critique premised on the idea of “false-consciousness.” More-
over, as we saw in Part I, fantasy—insofar as this speaks to the idea of 
split subjectivity—can be used as a critical “entry point” for any and all 
moments in an economic circuit, including aspects and phases of rele-
vant policy processes. 
 
 76 The normative and ideological role of fantasy was especially clear to see in the MPs’ 
expenses scandal. See id. 
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2.     A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Market Boundaries 
 
In exploring the implications of these reflections for the question 
of market boundaries it is helpful to draw together two strands of my 
argument. The first strand seeks to show how the psychoanalytic inter-
vention can be understood as relevant to a number of “moments” in an 
economic circuit: moments of production, appropriation, distribution, 
exchange, and consumption. This means that the categories of subjectiv-
ity, enjoyment and fantasy can be understood as potentially pertinent for 
any one of these moments, including the way they are reflected into 
different stages of the policy process. Moreover, in this view, markets 
are understood as highly complex and overdetermined entities that put 
into question straightforward oppositions between markets and states, 
free markets and regulation, and so on. In trying to understand processes 
of marketization in the public sector, for example, it is clear that the 
moments of production, consumption, and exchange are closely inter-
twined. In other words, the delivery of public services is a lot messier 
than the standard supermarket image of the market would lead us to 
expect, and that this complexity needs to be addressed when evaluating 
efforts to marketize particular goods or services. 
A second strand of my argument, however, seeks to better under-
stand not so much the site of psychoanalytic intervention (cashed out in 
terms of a moment of consumption, production, or exchange, or in 
terms of a policy stage/level), but the character of such an intervention. 
One way to grasp this, as I have argued above, is through the category 
of “matter.” But it is still unclear how the idea of a psychoanalytic mat-
ter can serve as a supplement to the way ANT, for example, deploys the 
notion of matter in trying to ascertain the limits and boundaries of mar-
kets. I will thus briefly compare and contrast the ANT and psychoana-
lytic approaches to matter, showing how this bears upon the question of 
markets and market boundaries. 
Treating markets in terms of calculative logics seeks to capture 
something about market practice that is “robust” in the sense that it ex-
ceeds conscious attempts by any one individual to modify or alter that 
practice. This is because such logics are embedded not just in a set of 
institutional positions and relations, but also in a range of material cal-
culative assemblages comprising agencies, bodies, instruments, and 
tools. These calculative assemblages work also at the very limits of dis-
course and meaning, precisely at those moments when perturbations 
exceed their capacity to discursively and meaningfully process them, at 
least in any immediate way. The same applies, of course, when we ex-
amine the domain of health in terms of logics of care and attunement. In 
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both cases, the source of the perturbations marking the limits of dis-
course lie outside the boundaries of their respective domains. The do-
mains of markets and health merely have different means or “logics” by 
which they seek to process the externally induced discursive perturba-
tions they experience. 
The distinct ways in which discursive limits are circumscribed in 
these two domains becomes more apparent when their respective logics 
bump up against each other, for example, through various attempts to 
implement policy reforms that introduce market logics into the domain 
of health. The health sector, insofar as this is informed by logics of care 
embodied in material-institutional assemblages, tends to experience 
these market reform initiatives as intrusions that provoke normative 
questions. For example, to what extent might importing market logics 
into the domain of health respect sufficiently the values embedded in 
social logics of care and attunement, or, if not, do the sorts of values 
market logics promote compensate for those it will marginalize? 
What then does a psychoanalytic perspective add to this picture? 
My argument here is that fantasy adds a further dimension to our analy-
sis because it takes its bearing largely from a different sort of matter, 
linked to a limit whose primary source of affective energy is inherent to 
its discourse and not one that is external to it. This is because discourse 
comprises not just meanings, structures of meaning, and institutions that 
embody and reinforce those structures of meaning. Discourses are also 
animated by individual and collective subjects who, as subjects of de-
sire, are in the business of constituting and projecting fantasies of one 
sort or another. Such fantasies respond to the inherent limits of dis-
course, the impossibility of “saying it all,” thereby structuring a particu-
lar sort of matter, distinct from the one that serves as the central object 
for ANT.77 This implies that what accounts for the resilience and draw 
of market practices, or indeed other sorts of practices, are not simply the 
material calculative or care assemblages, along with the meanings, hab-
its, norms, discourses, and institutional matrices associated with them. 
These are important for sure; but what accounts for their resilience and 
draw is also the fantasmatically structured enjoyment that courses 
through, and in this way also constitutes, such practices. 
A psychoanalytic perspective might therefore open up the follow-
ing sorts of question: What sorts of fantasies can serve as support for the 
operation of market logics? What fantasmatic narrative might bolster 
the idea that we can and should delimit in an as precise a manner as 
possible the goods and services we produce and consume? Do we find 
 
 77 This is not to say that these two sorts of matter (i.e., extradiscursive and intradiscursive 
matter) cannot sometimes become mutually imbricated. On this, see Jason Glynos, Body, Dis-
course, and the Turn to Matter, in LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY, AND THE HUMAN: NEW INTERVEN-
TIONS (Sanja Bahun & Dušan Radunovic eds, 2012). 
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fantasies that reinforce or project aspirations of control, mastery, and 
self-sufficiency? And what precise form and content do they assume? 
Let’s call them fantasies of independence. Conversely, if we look to the 
various logics informing social and health care practices, might we find 
there a wish for pastoral or paternal care, a desire for protection or for 
safe and unconditional containment? Let’s call them fantasies of the 
caring Other or fantasies of dependence. This analysis suggests we situ-
ate the psychoanalytic contribution to the debate about market bounda-
ries in the wider context of theories of ideology, because it promises to 
tell us something about the “grip” that market ideology exercises over 
us, or indeed the grip that a form of care ideology might exercise over 
us.78 A psychoanalytic perspective can thus contribute to the debate 
over market boundaries by opening up these sorts of explanatory ques-
tions for us. But it also aspires to furnish us with a critical vantage 
point. 
From a normative point of view, a psychoanalytic perspective does 
not, of course, enable us to take sides in any simple way. It does not 
come out in favour of fantasies of self-sufficiency over fantasies of the 
caring Other, for example, or vice versa. Nor can we deduce in any 
straightforward or direct way from psychoanalytic theory itself whether 
we should support those who seek to introduce the market into health 
care or those who seek to protect the state, the user, or the medical pro-
fessionals from such incursions. In a clinical context, of course, some 
schools of psychoanalysis explicitly caution against analysts making 
normative interventions. In a social-policy context, however, it is clear 
that any normative contribution inspired by psychoanalysis will be a 
product of a complex process of articulation. Psychoanalytic principles 
can and are brought to bear on those normative impulses immanent in 
the practices under study, as well as relevant normative theories, but the 
outcomes of such efforts cannot be determined outside the trajectories 
and wider contexts of these articulatory processes. 
Perhaps, however, the strongest critical contribution of psychoana-
lytic praxis ought to be situated in an ideological, rather than normative, 
plane. This can best be seen in its effort to show what fantasies of inde-
 
 78 For a sample of works exploring an area of thought defined by the intersection of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, political economy, and theories of ideology, see generally TODD MCGOWAN, 
THE END OF DISSATISFACTION? JACQUES LACAN AND THE EMERGING SOCIETY OF ENJOYMENT 
(2004); RENATA SALECL, ON ANXIETY: THINKING IN ACTION (2004); RENATA SALECL, THE 
TYRANNY OF CHOICE (2010); JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, 
LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE (1998); SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE PARALLAX VIEW (2006); 
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY (1989); Jason Glynos, The Grip of Ideology: 
A Lacanian Approach to the Theory of Ideology, 6 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 191 (2001); Glynos, supra 
note 10; Özselçuk & Madra, Enjoyment as an Economic Factor, supra note 13; Özselçuk & 
Madra, supra note 12; Yannis Stavrakakis, Symbolic Authority, Fantasmatic Enjoyment and the 
Spirits of Capitalism: Genealogies of Mutual Engagement, in LACAN AND ORGANIZATION, supra 
note 21, at 59. 
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pendence and fantasies dependence have in common, namely, the prom-
ise of a guarantee, or, to put it in other terms, the promise of subjective 
suture. Whether rooted in the individual user, the state official, or the 
medical professional, subjects can use these figures to flee the contin-
gency of social relations or, to put it another way, to flee the uncertainty 
and ambiguities of interdependence. 
This insight generates a different sort of question because it sug-
gests there might be another way to respond to ambiguity and uncertain-
ty. The worry motivating this thought is linked to the idea that the more 
invested we are in the guarantee that fantasy conjures, the more suscep-
tible we become to what we could call the “theft of enjoyment” tempta-
tion. This temptation involves projecting the inherent impossibility 
linked to subjectivity as such—the idea of a split subjectivity—onto an 
external figure who is then treated as an obstacle to the realization of 
our ideals: the inefficient or lazy public servant, or the greedy private 
provider chasing after a fast buck, for example. One question this gen-
erates, then, is under what conditions might one move beyond market 
fantasies of self-sufficiency and independence without falling into 
equally problematic dependency fantasies of the State or Professional 
qua Caring Others?79 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the case of market boundaries, perhaps we can approach this last 
question by exploring modes of interdependence in various experi-
mental community economies, such as time banking, local exchange 
trading systems, as well as other sorts of local currency and forms of 
exchange. In a climate of spending cuts, it is not surprising that the idea 
of coproduction, pioneered by Elinor Ostrom, is being revived and ac-
tively promoted in policy circles. But what the above analysis shows is 
that it is not just the normative principles that are at stake when thinking 
about the role and scope of markets in the provision of public services. 
At stake also are the fantasies that underpin relevant practices and poli-
cy shifts. 
If the phrase “mediatized politics”80 accurately signals the contem-
porary blurring of the mediatic and political aspects of news stories, it 
 
 79 The logics approach I have developed in collaboration with David Howarth can be under-
stood as a way of bringing into focus the critical potential of a Lacanian conception of fantasy by 
situating fantasmatic logics in relation to what we call, following the work of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, social and political logics. GLYNOS & HOWARTH, supra note 14. The claim, in 
other words, is that appeal to social and political logics helps make clearer the normative, politi-
cal, and ethical implications of fantasy. 
 80 MAARTEN A. HAJER, AUTHORITATIVE GOVERNANCE: POLICY-MAKING IN THE AGE OF 
MEDIATIZATION (2009). 
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becomes increasingly important to rethink the notion of normative and 
ideological critique in a way that is sensitive to this terrain of common 
sense construction. From the point of view of a critical political econo-
my, this means acknowledging the porous and overdetermined character 
of the entire economic circuit, whether in existing economic processes 
or in new experimental community economies. Each of the moments of 
an economic circuit is heavily implicated in, its degrees of movement 
and maneuver shaped by, the discourse of mediatized popular story 
telling as well as more elite-level policy-making. I have argued that 
there are good reasons to believe that a psychoanalytic perspective may 
help contribute to the task of evaluating such developments at the ideo-
logical level, supplementing and complicating existing efforts to inter-
vene at explanatory and normative levels. 
